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Abstract. We report the results of a questionnaire study on the fair distribution of 
indivisible goods. We collected data from three different subject pools, first- and second- 
year students majoring in economics, law students, and advanced economics students 
with some background knowledge of fairness theories. The purpose of this study is to 
assess the empirical relevance of various fairness criteria such as inequality aversion, the 
utilitarian principle of maximizing the sum of individual payoffs, the Rawlsian 
“maximin” principle of maximizing the payoff of the worst-off individual, and the 
criterion of envy-freeness (in the sense of Foley, 1967). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
The question of which allocations are perceived by individuals as fair, or just, has 
received considerable attention in recent years. The interest in this question has been 
further sparked by the extensive experimental literature in economics demonstrating that 
individual behavior is not only guided by the pursuit of material self-interest, but to a 
significant extent also by fairness considerations (see, among many others, Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002, Camerer 2003, and 
Engelmann and Strobel 2004). But what do people consider to be fair? There are several 
dimensions in which one can expect different answers to that question. First, individual 
perceptions of fairness are known to be context-dependent. For instance, fairness plays a 
fundamentally different role in strategic settings versus market settings, in allocation 
problems with indivisible goods versus divisible goods, in situations with “strangers” 
versus “partners,” etc. Secondly, fairness perceptions vary across individuals, depending, 
among other things, on gender (see, e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), educational 
background (see, e.g., Marwell and Ames 1981), or cultural background (see, e.g., 
Henrich et al. 2001). In this paper, we address the issue of fairness in a non-strategic 
context with indivisible goods. We report the results of a questionnaire study conducted 
in three classes with different students at the University of Bonn in 2001. The students 
were lower-level economics students (first and second year), law students, and more 
advanced economics students attending a course on “Theories of Distributive Justice” 
held by one of us. The students were given time at the end of the three classes to do the 
questionnaire – all students completed the questionnaire latest by the end of class time 
(they were free to leave once they were done). Participants were instructed to not 
communicate with each other whilst working on the questionnaire. The number of 
participants was 58 in the advanced economics course, 158 in the lower-level economics 
course (“Mathematics for Economists”), and 51 in the law course. In total 267 individuals 
participated and filled out the questionnaire. 
 The questionnaire contained 10 hypothetical allocation problems with two or three 
individuals.
1
 For each allocation problem, the subjects were asked to determine the 
distribution they personally considered to be the fairest. We stressed that there is no right 
or wrong answer to this problem and emphasized the normative content of the question. 
With the exception of two allocation problems, we explicitly asked the subjects to take on 
the role of an impartial arbiter; in the last two allocation problems, subjects were asked to 
take on the role of one particular concerned individual (see Appendix 1 for the exact 
wording of the questionnaire). 
 In each allocation problem, there were between three and six indivisible goods 
that could be given to any of the individuals, or not distributed at all. In three allocation 
problems there was an additional divisible amount of money that could be distributed. 
Each good could be given to at most one individual, whereas money could be split in any 
way between individuals or thrown away. An important feature of our allocation 
problems is that the same good generally has different values for different individuals. 
This feature is crucial in order to test the criterion of envy-freeness in the sense of Foley 
                                                 
1
 The law students were given only 8 of the 10 allocation problems (see Section 2 below).  
 2 
(1967), according to which an allocation is envy-free if no individual would like to swap 
his or her bundle for the bundle of anybody else. 
 The main purpose of the questionnaire study reported here is to determine the 
empirical relevance of competing fairness criteria such as envy-freeness, inequality 
aversion, the utilitarian principle, and the Rawlsian maximin solution.
2
 At times, some of 
these criteria can be in conflict with Pareto optimality, and we were also interested in 
finding out how this particular conflict would be resolved. While often criticized for its 
lack of providing sufficient incentives for subjects, the questionnaire approach has some 
tradition in the fairness literature, see Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), Gaertner et al. (2001, 
2002) for related studies, and Gaertner (2006, Chapter 9) and Konow (2003) for 
overviews on empirical fairness studies more generally. In our context, the absence of 
such incentives is mitigated by the fact that individuals were put in the position of 
impartial arbiters who do not directly benefit from the individuals’ payoffs anyway.
 Our motivation for introducing different subject pools was to investigate whether 
economics students respond differently to fairness issues than law students, and more 
importantly, whether an exposure to theoretical economic research on justice has an 
impact on what subjects consider to be fair.
3
 
 The present study complements our previous experimental work in this area, 
specifically Herreiner and Puppe (2007), where the criterion of envy-freeness has been 
experimentally investigated for the first time, and Herreiner and Puppe (2006), where we 
study the possible trade-off between fairness and Pareto optimality in laboratory 
experiments. In the latter paper, we explain individual behavior by means of a simple 
procedure according to which bargainers first determine an “egalitarian reference 
distribution” and then choose a Pareto improvement, provided that this does not result in 
too much inequality. Our results concerning the relevance of envy-freeness in the context 
of laboratory experiments are mixed (see Herreiner and Puppe 2007 for details). That 
envy-freeness has empirical relevance in certain contexts is demonstrated in Herreiner 
(2007), also using the questionnaire method. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
present the allocation problems and list the allocations chosen most frequently by the 
subjects. In Section 3, we use our data to test whether the economics students make 
different choices than the law students, and whether an exposure to fairness theories 
alters attitudes towards fairness criteria. Although not in all problems, in general, law 
students seem to be more prone to pick Pareto optimal and potentially less equal 
allocations than economics students. 
 We emphasize that the present questionnaire approach is explorative in the sense 
that we do not test specific hypotheses on the behavior of individuals. Rather, we hope 
that the data and the results will be used and analyzed further to develop a sense of what 
kind of fairness criteria matter in what kind of allocation problems.  
 
                                                 
2
 For overviews of the theoretical literature on fair allocations, see e.g. Brams and Taylor (1996), Thomson 
(2005) and Young (1994). 
3
 The upper-level students attending the course on distributive justice had a previous exposure to the basic 
fairness concepts considered here in the context of an exchange economy with divisible goods. The aspects 
arising from the indivisibilities were new to them. The other students had no previous exposure to fairness 
concepts in economics and theories of distributive justice. 
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2. The Allocation Problems and Most Frequent Choices 
We now present and discuss the allocation problems presented to the subjects. In order to 
facilitate the assessment of our results, we provide a summary of the most frequent 
choices directly after the description of each problem. We present and comment on only 
what we consider to be the most interesting and striking results – all allocation choices 
reported in the tables below are significantly different from random choices.
4
 The 
complete data set is provided in Appendix 2 below, and we invite the interested reader to 
have a closer look there. Unless stated otherwise, all numbers and percentages refer to the 
choices aggregated over all three subject pools, i.e. lower- and upper-level economists 
and law students.
5
     
 
Problem 1  
The first problem involved three hypothetical goods, labeled A, B and C, and two 
individuals, labeled I and II. The following table gives the value of the goods for each 
individual. Good A is worth 49 units to individual I and 47 units to individual II. 
Similarly, good B is worth 46 to individual I and 48 to individual II. Finally, good C is 
worth 5 to both individuals.
6
 Each good can be given to at most one individual. Subjects 
had the opportunity to “throw away” goods, i.e. not to allocate goods to either individual.      
 
PROBLEM 1 
 
 A B C 
I 49 46 5 
II 47 48 5 
 
Since each good can be given to either individual or not be distributed, there are thus in 
total 3
3 
= 27 different allocations. Clearly, efficiency requires that all goods be 
distributed. 
 The distribution problem reflects a simple but basic conflict between payoff 
equality and efficiency, or alternatively, between envy-freeness and efficiency. The 
“most equal” allocations in which all goods are distributed are the allocation (A,BC), i.e. 
good A goes to individual I, and goods B and C go to individual II, with a resulting 
payoff vector (49,53), and the allocation (BC,A) with a resulting payoff vector (51,47). 
Both allocations display an interpersonal payoff difference of four units. Of these two 
allocations, only the first is Pareto optimal, since the allocation (AC,B) with payoff 
vector (54,48) Pareto dominates the allocation (BC,A). All allocations in which all three 
                                                 
4
 Based on χ
2
-tests considering all allocations and subsets of the most frequently chosen allocations; all 
respective p-values are so close to zero to be significant at all relevant significance levels. The only 
exception to this is Problem 2 when considering only the two most frequently chosen allocations. 
5
 The figures below always give the percentages in relation to all observations including invalid and no 
answers. 
6
 Note that the values in the rows add up to 100. This is true for all allocation problems considered here. 
Our reason for designing the problems in this way was to create a kind of ex-ante symmetry in the sense 
that the bundle consisting of all goods should have the same value for all individuals.  
 4 
goods are distributed involve envy in the sense that at least one individual would be better 
off with the bundle of the other individual.
7
 For instance, individual I is envious of 
individual II under the allocation (A,BC), since with the bundle BC individual I would 
receive a payoff of  51 (instead of the payoff 49 resulting from good A). The only way to 
avoid envy in this sense is to not distribute at least one good. A natural way to create 
envy-freeness is to dispose of good C and to give the two other goods to the individuals 
who value them most, yielding the allocation (A,B) with payoff vector (49,48). Note that 
the resulting payoff difference of one unit is smaller than the smallest payoff difference in 
all Pareto optimal allocations. 
 
 The following table indicates the most frequently chosen allocations and shows 
their relevant properties (EF stands for envy-free, U for the utilitarian solution, MM for 
the Rawlsian maximin solution, and IA for the allocation that minimizes the (maximal) 
difference between individual payoffs). 
 
 
 
 
Allocation 
 
Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto 
optimal 
Fairness 
criteria 
(A,B) (49,48) 70.4 No EF, IA 
(A,BC) (49,53) 23.2 Yes U, MM 
 
Results for Problem 1 
 
 
Thus, more than 70% of the subjects proposed to dispose of good C and thus opted for a 
Pareto inferior allocation. Whether this behavior was guided by inequality aversion or 
envy considerations cannot be decided using our data; see Problem 4 for a related 
discussion. Our results in Herreiner and Puppe (2007) suggest that interpersonal equality 
is empirically more relevant than the more complex intrapersonal criterion of envy-
freeness. Efficiency considerations are certainly not completely ignored, as can be seen 
from the fact that the overwhelming majority of the subjects that distributed two or three 
goods allocated goods A and B according to their maximal value (giving good C to the 
person with the lower payoff in the latter case).
8
 
 
 
Problem 2 
The second problem involved four goods to be distributed among three individuals. 
 
                                                 
7
 Formally, an individual is envious at a certain allocation if he or she would be better off with the bundle 
allocated to some other individual than with his or her own bundle. An allocation is envy-free if no 
individual is envious.   
8
 All allocations not shown in the table were chosen with a frequency of less than 2%.  
 5 
PROBLEM 2 
 
 A B C D 
I 5 47 45 3 
II 45 5 48 2 
III 23 25 32 20 
 
A distinctive feature of this division problem is that there is the possibility to create a 
perfectly egalitarian distribution via the allocation (C,A,BD) in which individual I 
receives good C, individual II receives good A, and individual III receives goods B and 
D. The resulting payoff vector is (45,45,45). As in the first problem, there is a conflict 
between inequality and efficiency, but now efficiency is compatible with envy-freeness. 
First, note that the egalitarian allocation (C,A,BD) is neither Pareto efficient, nor envy-
free. The allocation (B,A,CD) with a resulting payoff vector (47,45,52) Pareto dominates 
(C,A,BD); moreover, under the egalitarian allocation individual I envies individual III 
and individual II envies individual I. The allocation (B,A,CD) is itself Pareto efficient but 
not envy-free, since both individuals I and II envy individual III. There is a Pareto 
efficient and envy-free allocation in this example, namely (B,C,AD) with the resulting 
payoff vector (47,48,43). Note that this allocation is not Pareto superior to the egalitarian 
distribution and does therefore not respect the CPIES criterion (“Conditional Pareto 
Improvement from Equal Split”) suggested in Herreiner and Puppe (2006).
9
 
 In this example, there is another noteworthy contender in terms of fairness, 
namely the “utilitarian” allocation (B,AC,D) which maximizes the sum of the payoffs. 
The resulting payoff vector is (47,93,20). By definition, the utilitarian allocation is Pareto 
efficient. As the present example shows, it may result in significant inequality across 
individuals. The utilitarian distribution obviously emerges by giving each good to the 
individual who values it most. 
 
 The following table gives the most frequent choices. All allocations not shown in 
the table were chosen with a frequency of less than 5%. 
 
 
Allocation 
 
Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto  
optimal 
Fairness 
criteria 
(C,A,BD) (45,45,45) 26.2 No IA, MM 
(B,C, AD) (47,48,43) 26.2 Yes EF 
(B,A,CD) (47,45,52) 12.7 Yes MM 
(B,AC,D) (47,93,20) 9.0 Yes U 
(B,A,C) (47,45,32) 7.9 No - 
 
Results for Problem 2 
                                                 
9
 The term “conditional” refers to the fact that only those Pareto improvements which do not involve too 
much inequality may qualify as “fair.”   
 6 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, the egalitarian and the Pareto optimal envy-free allocation 
tie for the most frequently chosen allocation. The third most chosen allocation is a Pareto 
improvement from the equal distribution and therefore respects the fairness criterion 
proposed in Herreiner and Puppe (2006). 
 
 
Problem 3 
The third problem involved five goods to be distributed among three individuals. 
Problems 3 and 5 below were the most complex problem that we presented to our 
subjects. 
 
PROBLEM 3 
 
 A B C D E 
I 40 2 3 25 30 
II 14 26 8 26 26 
III 10 26 26 12 26 
 
 
The distinctive feature of this problem is that there are two payoff-equivalent Pareto 
efficient allocations, of which only one is envy-free. These two allocations are 
(A,BD,CE) and (A,DE,BC). The resulting payoff vector is (40,52,52) in both cases. The 
first allocation is envy-free, but under the second allocation individual I envies individual 
II.
10
 While envy-freeness can always be achieved by disposing goods (for instance, 
trivially, by disposing all goods), the above allocation (A,BD,CE) is the only envy-free 
and Pareto optimal distribution in this example. The two allocations above are also the 
two allocations that maximize the payoff of the worst-off individual. In other words, they 
both represent the “Rawlsian” solution in this example. There are two utilitarian 
allocations, namely (AE,BD,C) with payoff vector (70,52,26) and (AE,D,BC) with 
payoff vector (70,26,52). 
 
 Problem 3 was not presented to the law students. The total number of observations 
was therefore 58 + 158 = 216. In this problem, we observed many different allocations. 
The following table only shows the two most frequent choices. These are the two payoff-
equivalent Rawlsian solutions, of which only one is envy-free. The envy-free variant is 
chosen more than twice as frequently.
11
 All other allocations were chosen with a 
frequency of less than 10%.
12
 
                                                 
10
 Since envy-freeness is the only fairness criterion that can distinguish the two allocations, examples like 
this one are particularly suitable as “pure” tests of envy-freeness, i.e. of the relevance of envy-freeness 
independently of any other fairness considerations. Herreiner (2007) provides detailed results and tests 
based on an independent and richer data set. 
11
 This is in line with the findings of Herreiner (2007), where it is shown that the envy-free allocation is 
chosen significantly more often in a number of similar allocation problems. 
12
 Other choices were (A,BC,DE) at 9.7%, (A,D,C) at 7.9%, and (AE,D,C) at 5.1%. The two utilitarian 
allocations were chosen with a total probability of 7.0%. 
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Allocation 
 
Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto  
Optimal 
Fairness 
criteria 
(A,BD,CE) (40,52,52) 27.8 Yes EF, MM 
(A,DE,BC) (40,52,52) 12.5 Yes MM 
 
Results for Problem 3 
 
 
Problem 4 
The fourth problem is a three-person variant of the conflict between equality and 
efficiency, respectively envy-freeness and efficiency, already addressed in Problem 1 
above. 
PROBLEM 4 
 
 A B C D 
I 30 31 32 7 
II 33 29 31 7 
III 31 32 30 7 
  
 
The allocation (C,A,B) is envy-free with resulting payoff vector (32,33,32). Clearly, 
since good D is not distributed, this allocation is not Pareto optimal. There is also a 
perfectly egalitarian solution, (B,C,A) with payoff vector (31,31,31), which is, however, 
Pareto dominated by the envy-free allocation (C,A,B). There are three utilitarian 
solutions, (CD,A,B),  (C,AD,B), and (C,A,BD), which differ only by who receives good 
D. Note that all three of these, as well as the above envy-free allocation, involve a 
minimal individual payoff of 32. 
  
 In terms of the conflict between Pareto optimality and equality/ envy-freeness, the 
results of Problem 4 are very similar to Problem 1: An overwhelming majority of subjects 
is willing to sacrifice “some” efficiency for fairness in the sense of equality, or of envy-
freeness. In Problem 4 subjects are willing to sacrifice efficiency significantly more 
frequently (P=0.00004 based on a χ
2
-test) by throwing away one good, C and D 
respectively. Of the relevant choices, in Problem 4 the additional good is thrown out in 
89% of the cases, whereas it is thrown out “only” in 77% of the choices in Problem 1. In 
Problem 4 the additional good has greater value and can therefore create more inequality 
if assigned to one of the individuals. Given the choices shown in the table below, one 
could argue that sacrificing efficiency in Problem 4 supports envy-freeness more than 
inequality aversion. However, (C,A,B) also Pareto dominates the perfectly egalitarian 
 8 
allocation (B,C,A) at a minimal increase of inequality. All allocations not shown in the 
table were chosen with a frequency of less than 5%.
13
 
 
 
Allocation 
 
Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto 
optimal 
Fairness 
Criteria 
(C,A,B) (32,33,32) 64.4 No EF, MM 
(B,C,A) (31,31,31) 16.5 No IA 
 
Results for Problem 4 
  
 
Problem 5 
The fifth problem was the most complex and involved six goods, as follows. 
 
PROBLEM 5 
 
 A B C D E F 
I 5 20 32 3 25 15 
II 26 7 23 20 2 22 
III 24 17 6 21 30 2 
 
Again, there is an equality-efficiency conflict. The allocation (BE,CF,AD) results in the 
perfectly egalitarian payoff distribution (45,45,45), but even though all goods are 
distributed this allocation is neither Pareto optimal nor envy-free. Indeed, at the 
egalitarian allocation individual I envies individual II, individual II envies individual III 
who, in turn, envies individual I. There is thus a feasible exchange of bundles that would 
make everyone better off, yielding the allocation (CF,AD,BE) with payoffs (47,46,47); 
hence, the first allocation is not Pareto optimal. Besides the perfectly egalitarian 
distribution, the other focal allocation is (BC,AF,DE) yielding the payoff vector 
(52,48,51). This allocation is the utilitarian solution, and is thus Pareto optimal. It also 
represents the Rawlsian solution, is envy-free, and Pareto dominates the other two 
allocations. There are also other Pareto optimal and envy-free allocations in this example. 
 
 The following table gives the four allocations that were chosen with a frequency 
of more than 5%. A total of 58.3% of the subjects opted for a Pareto improvement 
relative to the perfectly equal distribution (the first and the third allocation in the table), 
confirming the analysis of Herreiner and Puppe (2006). Clearly, the payoff inequality at 
allocation (BC,AF,DE) is sufficiently small so that participants chose that allocation 
much more frequently than the more equal Pareto improvement (CF,AD,BE). Note that 
in the fourth allocation in the table, every individual only receives his or her most 
                                                 
13
 The three utilitarian allocations together were chosen by slightly more than 10% of the subjects. There 
were no significant differences in the probability of each of these being chosen (P=0.3679 based on a χ
2 
–
test).
 
 
 9 
valuable single good. This problem was the second problem not presented to the law 
students.  
  
 
 
Allocation 
 
Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto 
Optimal 
Fairness 
Criteria 
(BC,AF,DE) (52,48,51) 50.0 Yes 
EF, U, 
MM 
(BE,CF,AD) (45,45,45) 9.3 No IA 
(CF,AD,BE) (47,46,47) 8.3 No EF 
(C,A,E) (32,26,30) 6.9 No EF 
 
Results for Problem 5 
 
 
Problem 6 
The sixth problem is similar to Problem 2, and related to Problem 5 above. 
 
PROBLEM 6 
 
 A B C D 
I 48 4 3 45 
II 25 20 40 15 
III 2 1 45 52 
 
As in Problems 2 and 5 above, there is a perfectly egalitarian allocation, (D,AB,C) with 
payoff vector (45,45,45), which is not envy-free and Pareto dominated by the Rawlsian 
solution (A,BC,D) which is Pareto optimal with payoff vector (48,60,52).
14
 As an 
important difference to Problem 2, here the Rawlsian solution does not coincide with the 
utilitarian solution (A,B,CD) with payoff vector (48,20,97). Moreover, in contrast to 
Problem 5, both the Rawlsian and the utilitarian solution involve significant individual 
payoff differences. 
 
 Although in this problem the Rawlsian solution is also envy-free, the Pareto 
dominated egalitarian allocation is chosen significantly more often, as shown in the 
following table. Despite its considerable payoff differences the utilitarian allocation is 
still chosen with probability 7.9%. All allocations not shown in the table were chosen 
with a frequency of less than 3%. 
 
                                                 
14
 In Problem 2, the egalitarian allocation (C,A,BD) with payoff vector (45,45,45) is Pareto dominated by 
(B,A,CD) with payoff vector (47,45,52). While both involve a minimal payoff of 45, the latter represents 
the lexicographic refinement of the “Rawlsian” solution. What we call the “Rawlsian” solution is 
sometimes referred to more precisely as the “leximin” solution.   
 10 
 
Allocation 
 
Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto 
Optimal 
Fairness 
Criteria 
(D,AB,C) (45,45,45) 32.6 No IA 
(A,BC,D) (48,60,52) 28.1 Yes EF, MM 
(A,C,D) (48,40,52) 18.4 No EF 
(A,B,CD) (48,20,97) 7.9 Yes U 
 
Results for Problem 6 
 
 
Problem 7 
In addition to the indivisible goods, problem 7 (and two other problems below) also 
involved a divisible amount of money that could be distributed among the individuals. In 
this example, the amount was given by M=5 units. Participants were told that money is 
comparable to the value of the goods, so that a good with a certain value should be 
considered equivalent to the corresponding amount of money.   
 
PROBLEM 7 
 
 A B C 
I 45 30 25 
II 35 40 25 
III 50 5 45 
MONEY 
AMOUNT 
M=5 
 
 
Our reason to introduce the money amount was to test whether subjects would use the 
money to compensate for envy, or alternatively, for inequality. The two focal allocations 
are (A,B,C) with the money given to individual II and the same distribution (A,B,C) but 
with money going to individual III. The first allocation yields the perfectly equal payoff 
vector (45,40+5,45); it is also Pareto optimal, but individual III envies individual I. The 
second allocation results in the payoff vector (45,40,45+5) and is envy-free and also 
Pareto optimal. 
 
 These two allocations were chosen the most frequently. More than 80% of the 
subjects chose the goods allocation (A,B,C). Of these 223 subjects, a majority of 65.9% 
allocated the 5 units of money to individual II, thus creating the egalitarian payoff vector 
(45,40+5,45). Another 15.2% of these 223 subjects allocated the 5 units of money to 
individual III, thus compensating envy. 
 
Problem 8 
The eighth problem is similar in structure to Problem 2 and the same as Problem 6 with 
goods A and D swapped, however here there are in addition 7 units of money to be 
distributed. 
 11 
 
PROBLEM 8 
 
 A B C D 
I 45 4 3 48 
II 15 20 40 25 
III 52 1 45 2 
MONEY 
AMOUNT 
M=7 
 
 
There are two focal allocations of the goods. The allocation (A,BD,C) results in the 
egalitarian payoff vector (45,45,45). Given this, the crucial question is again how the 
money is used. Note that the 7 monetary units are just enough to compensate individual 
III for his/her envy (since individual III would receive a payoff of 52 from good A). On 
the other hand, Pareto optimality and envy-freeness can be achieved by the goods 
allocation (D,BC,A) together with any distribution (x1,x2,x3) of the money such that 
x1+x2+x3 = 7 and x1 ≥ x3 - 3. 
 
 The following table indicates the five most frequently chosen goods allocations, 
irrespective of the money allocation. Since the properties of the entire allocation (of the 
goods and the money) also depend on how the money was distributed, we cannot list the 
respective fairness criteria in the table.
15
 
 
 
Goods Allocation 
 
Payoff vector (based on 
goods only) 
Choices in % 
Pareto 
Optimal 
(D,BC,A) (48,60,52) 32.2 Yes 
(A,BD,C) (45,45,45) 22.5 No 
(D,C,A) (48,40,52) 16.9 No 
(D,B,AC) (48,20,97) 9.4 Yes 
(BD,C,A) (52,40,52) 7.5 depends 
 
Results for Problem 8 
 
Thus, 32.2% of the subjects chose the goods allocation (D,BC,A) which is Pareto optimal 
(if no money is thrown away) and envy-free, while only 22.5% chose the “egalitarian” 
goods allocation (A,BD,C). Another 16.9% chose the goods allocation (D,C,A) which 
gives each individual the single good he or she values most. The utilitarian goods 
allocation (D,B,AC) was chosen by 9.4%, and the allocation (BD,C,A) which equalizes 
the payoffs of individuals I and III by 7.5%. All other goods allocations were chosen with 
frequency of less than 5%. 
                                                 
15
 Whether an allocation is Pareto optimal of course also depends on the money distribution. A “Yes” in the 
right column only presupposes that no money is thrown away. A “No” means that for no money 
distribution the relevant allocation is Pareto optimal. Whether the fourth allocation in the table is Pareto 
optimal depends non-trivially on the money distribution. 
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 In 87% of the choices of the goods allocation (D,BC,A) all money was 
distributed, whereas this is true of only 27% of the choices of the goods allocation 
(A,BD,C) (see the data summary in the appendix). In the latter case, more than half of the 
participants either gave two units of money to everybody
16
 or nothing. Money thus seems 
to matter much less if the goods allocation alone yields equal payoffs, whereas it matters 
if it can be used to make payoffs more equal. Among the (D,BC,A) allocation choices 
almost all address the payoff inequalities through money: more than half gave the largest 
amount to the first individual, the second most to the third individual, and the least to the 
second individual. Another 28% distributed the money such that the second individual 
with the highest payoff from the goods received the least. For 97% of the (D,BC,A) 
choices money was allocated also in a manner that guaranteed envy-freeness. 
 A comparison of Problems 6 and 8 shows that here the Pareto optimal and envy-
free allocation is chosen significantly more frequently whereas in the identical Problem 6 
the egalitarian allocation is chosen more frequently (P-value of 0.0204 based on a χ
2
-
test). The fact that money can be used to address some of the “inequality shortcomings” 
of the Pareto optimal allocation seems to be sufficient to reverse the choice frequencies. 
The utilitarian allocation, however, is chosen with comparable frequencies in both 
problems. The inequalities inherent in that goods allocation are too large to be mitigated 
by the relatively small amount of money available in Problem 8.   
 
Problem 9 
The final two problems differ from the rest since they abandon the neutral framing. 
Instead of suggesting an allocation for two or three other individuals, subjects were now 
asked to imagine themselves in the role of one of the concerned individuals (see 
Appendix 1 for the exact formulation). The ninth problem was given as follows. 
 
PROBLEM 9 
 
 A B C D 
YOUR VALUATION 23 40 20 17 
2. PLAYER 2 43 1 54 
3. PLAYER 49 4 4 43 
 
Except for the non-neutral framing, this problem is structurally the same as Problem 6 
above.
17
 There is a perfectly egalitarian allocation, (AC,B,D) with payoff vector 
(43,43,43), at which both individuals II and III (but not the person who proposes the 
distribution) are envious. The Rawlsian solution (BC,D,A) with payoff vector (60,54,49) 
is envy-free and also Pareto optimal. 
 
 The following table gives the three most frequent choices (all other allocations 
were chosen with frequency less than 5%. 
                                                 
16
Making the perfectly equal payoff vector (47,47,47) the most frequently chosen single allocation of the 
goods and the money. 
17
 The problems are the same for all relevant fairness criteria. Specifically, up to a payoff difference of two 
units, Problem 6 is obtained from Problem 9 by swapping goods B and C, and permuting individual 
preferences. 
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Allocation Payoff vector Choices in % 
Pareto 
optimal 
Fairness 
criteria 
(BC,D,A) (60,54,49) 34.1 Yes EF, MM 
(AC,B,D) (43,43,43) 30.0 No IA 
(B,D,A) (40,54,49) 17.6 No EF 
 
Results for Problem 9 
 
The choices here are not significantly different from those of the similar Problem 6 (P-
value of 0.2068 based on a χ
2
-test) contrary to Problem 8, although here the Pareto 
optimal allocation is chosen more frequently than the egalitarian allocation (contrary to 
Problem 6). The individual making the choice is the one that benefits most from the 
Pareto optimal allocation. However, as our results show this framing aspect is not as 
important as supplementing the allocation problem with a money amount to address the 
inequality in order to make the Pareto optimal allocation attractive. 
   
Problem 10 
The tenth and final problem combines the non-neutral framing of the preceding problem 
with the possibility to distribute a divisible amount of money. The problem is structurally 
similar to Problem 7 with individual I and III’s preferences swapped. 
 
PROBLEM 10 
 
 A B C 
YOUR VALUATION 53 3 44 
2. PLAYER 35 36 29 
3. PLAYER 44 30 25 
MONEY 
AMOUNT 
M=9 
 
 
The two focal goods allocations are (C,B,A) and (A,B,C). The allocation (C,B,A) yields 
the egalitarian payoff vector (44,44,44) by giving 8 monetary units to individual II. The 
proposer (individual I), however, is envious under this allocation. On the other hand, 
individual I’s envy at the allocation (C,B,A) could be compensated for by giving him or 
her the 9 monetary units (thereby creating envy on the part of individual II). 
 The allocation (A,B,C) gives both the proposer and individual II their most 
preferred good, but leaves individual III with envy even if he or she receives all the 
money. 
 
 In this problem, a clear majority of 198 subjects (74.2%) chose the goods 
allocation (C,B,A). The majority of them (61.6%) gave eight or nine monetary units to 
individual II, thus creating an egalitarian (or almost egalitarian) payoff distribution; 23 of 
the 198 subjects (11.6%) gave all the money to the envious individual I (the “proposer”). 
The goods allocation (A,B,C) was chosen by 31 subjects (11.6%); 20 of them gave more 
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money to individual III than to the other individuals, and another 9 of these subjects gave 
all the money to individual III. Thus, 29 of the 31 subjects who chose the goods 
allocation (A,B,C) at least partly compensated individual III for his or her envy. 
 Comparing the structurally similar Problems 7 and 10, in both cases over 80% of 
the subjects who chose the allocation that allowed to either address payoff inequality or 
envy (the goods allocation (A,B,C) in Problem 7, the goods allocation (C,B,A) here) 
opted to address primarily the inequality. Despite putting the deciding individual into the 
potentially envious position, envy was not compensated more frequently. As in Problem 
9, putting an individual into a specific position in the questionnaire does not seem to 
influence choices significantly, in particular not to that individual’s advantage. The share 
of individuals caring about equality as opposed to envy-freeness seems to be remarkably 
stable.     
 
3. Relevance of Experience and Knowledge 
We now investigate whether the different subject groups made consistently different 
choices. Comparing all three groups based on the most frequently chosen allocations 
yields the following results (the column “# alloc” gives the number of these allocations,
18
 
and the column “# obs” their total frequency). 
 
 
 # alloc # obs χ
2 
P-value 
Problem 1 2 250 0.53 0.7655 
Problem 2 2 140 5.09 0.0785 
Problem 3 2 87 0.86 0.3534 
Problem 4 2 216 1.50 0.4723 
Problem 5 3 146 3.15 0.2073 
Problem 6 3 211 7.51 0.1114 
Problem 7 2 181 0.16 0.9250 
Problem 8 7 173 23.02 0.0276 
Problem 9 3 218 6.22 0.1831 
Problem 10 7 214 27.27 0.0071 
 
Table 1: Differences in choice behaviour across all three subjects groups 
 
Table 1 shows P-values from one-tailed χ
2
-test for three independent samples. Significant 
differences emerge only in Problems 2, 8, and 10 (at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels, respectively, and indicated in bold in the table). For Problem 2, the two most and 
equally frequently chosen allocations (C,A,BD) and (B,C,AD) that address payoff 
equality and Pareto optimality paired with envy freeness, respectively, are chosen in a 
                                                 
18
 In Problem 7, the test was based on the allocations (A+0,B+5,C+0) and (A+0,B+0,C+5). In Problem 8 
the following allocations were considered (A+x,BD+x,C+x), (BD+y,C+x,A+y), (D+y,BC+z,A+x), 
(D+x,BC+y,A+x), (D+x,BC+z,A+y), (D+x,C+z,A+y), and (D+0,C+7,A+0), where x>y>z. In Problem 10, 
the relevant allocations are (C+y,B+x,A+y), (C+x,B+y,A+y), (C+y,B+x,A+z), (C+x,B+x,A+x), 
(A+y,B+y,C+x), (C+x,B+y,A+z), (A+z,B+y,C+x). In the data summary in the appendix, the three groups 
are referred to as “Econ” (advanced-level economics students), “Math” (lower-level economics students 
since the questionnaire was conducted in their Math class) and “Law” (law students). 
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significantly different way by the three groups (10% significance level): Law students 
chose the Pareto optimal and envy-free allocation more frequently than the economics 
students, both at the lower and more advanced level.   
 The same emerges for Problems 8 and 10.
19
 These results suggest that there is a 
systematic difference between the choices by economics and law students, which we 
investigate directly next. The two groups of economics students did generally not exhibit 
significant differences in their choices for all problems.
20
 
 The following table shows results that compare law students’ choices with both 
economist groups combined (lower-level and advanced level students).  
 
 
 # alloc # obs χ
2 
P-value 
Problem 1 2 250 0.17 0.6836 
Problem 2 2 140 4.46 0.0346 
Problem 4 2 216 0.01 0.9189 
Problem 6 3 211 6.10 0.0474 
Problem 7 2 181 0.04 0.8505 
Problem 8 7 173 12.67 0.0485 
Problem 9 3 218 2.62 0.2695 
Problem 10 7 214 12.38 0.0540 
 
Table 2: Differences in choice behaviour of law students vs. economics students 
In four problems, choice behaviour was significantly different between law students and 
economics students at least at a 10% level (again in highlighted bold in the table). The 
earlier results are confirmed: Law students generally chose more frequently a Pareto 
optimal allocation whereas economics students chose relatively more frequently an 
allocation that equalizes payoffs. In Problem 2 the Pareto optimal and envy free 
allocation (B,C,AD) was chosen more frequently than the egalitarian allocation (C,A,BD) 
by law students – 68% of the two most chosen allocations as compared to 46% by 
economists. In Problem 6, the Pareto optimal and envy free allocation (A,BC,D) is 
chosen more frequently than the other two allocations, the egalitarian allocation 
(A,BC,D) and the envy free allocation (A,C,D), by law students (50% vs. 32% among 
those three allocations). In Problem 8, the goods allocation (D,BC,A) with the largest 
money amount to the first and/or third individual was chosen more frequently by law 
students than economics students (63% vs. 35%); economics students chose more 
frequently (BD,C,A) and (D,C,A), almost exclusively with the money given to the person 
with the lowest payoff. In problem 10, law students chose relatively more frequently the 
goods allocation (A,B,C) giving money to the individual(s) with the lowest payoff(s) 
                                                 
19
 The significant results for Problems 8 and 10 reported in this section hold irrespective of what allocations 
exactly are considered, whether the ones considered here based on comparable payoff patterns, whether 
only the most frequently chosen specific allocations, or whether only the goods allocations.  
20
 P-values for χ
2
-tests are generally above 0.20 and mostly substantially higher. Contrary to all other tests 
reported here, for Problems 8 and 10 the P-value depends on exactly which allocations are included and 
grouped together when comparing the two economist subject groups (in each case one combination makes 
the differences between the two economist groups just significant at 10%). 
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(28% vs. 11% among the 7 considered allocations), whereas economics students focused 
more on allocation (C,B,A) using the money to compensate the worst-off individual or 
distributing money equally. 
Distinguishing the participants instead on the basis of prior exposure to envy-freeness, 
i.e. comparing advanced-level economics students to lower-level economics students and 
law students, based on a two-sample one-tailed χ 
2
-test gives the following results:
21
 
 
 
 # alloc # obs χ
2 
P-value 
Problem 1 2 250 0.23 0.6306 
Problem 2 2 140 1.87 0.1719 
Problem 4 2 216 1.45 0.2291 
Problem 6 3 211 0.29 0.8632 
Problem 7 2 181 0.08 0.7794 
Problem 8 7 173 5.93 0.4313 
Problem 9 3 218 3.56 0.1610 
Problem 10 7 214 14.84 0.0216 
 
Table 3: Differences in choices of experienced vs. non-experienced subjects 
 
The only significant difference in choice behaviour emerges for Problem 10. Here, the 
experienced subjects (those that had heard of envy-freeness before participating in this 
questionnaire) chose the allocation (C,B,A) giving most of the money (21% vs. 12%) or 
more money to the envious than to the third person (19% vs. 6% of the 7 considered 
allocations) more frequently than the other participants. That pattern, however, does not 
emerge in the related Problem 7. Hence, introduction to the concept of envy-freeness has 
to be combined with personal exposure to envy, to lead an individual to choose an envy 
free allocation more frequently. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The analysis above focuses on the outcomes suggested by participants and therefore on 
the distributive fairness aspects considered. It discusses the tension between efficiency, 
equity considerations and other fairness criteria such as envy-freeness. It also shows that 
there are no significant differences between allocations chosen by individuals with 
different backgrounds; in particular, economics students are not more likely to choose 
efficient or envy-free outcomes than law students. There is one obvious difference 
between economists enrolled in a class on fairness and justice (“experienced subjects”) 
and all other participants (“non-experienced subjects”) – experienced subjects use 
standard economics terminology to explain their choices (although not always correctly), 
whereas other participants use terms like efficiency or envy only very sparingly. 
                                                 
21
 Problem 3 and 5 were not given to the law students, the corresponding test is therefore the same as in 
Table 1 above, where all three groups are compared and where neither case showed any significant 
difference in choice behaviour. 
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Our analysis of the written explanations of participant choices yields two further 
interesting results. For one, individuals substantiate their choices mostly with procedural 
aspects.
22
 The most appealing procedures are based on assigning the goods to who values 
them most. Two versions of such a procedure exist; they do generally lead to different 
outcomes. The first possibility is to give each good to the individual that values it the 
most (with an appropriate tie-breaking rule). Alternatively, one could give each person 
the good that he or she values most (again, with an appropriate tie-breaking rule and 
some provision for allocating remaining goods). The first procedure yields an efficient 
outcome which also maximizes the utility sum; the second does not guarantee efficiency. 
Our participants relied on the second alternative in almost all cases where procedural 
arguments were made - efficiency seems to be less of a concern than satisfying individual 
preferences. In the cases where procedural aspects were not the main focus of 
participants' explanations, equity concerns were the predominant aspect considered. 
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Herreiner/Puppe Questionnaire Results 1
Allocations Total
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
A,B 188 40 113 35 0.70 49 48 EF IA
A B C A,BC 62 15 34 13 0.23 49 53 PO U MM
I 49 46 5 AC,B 5 1 3 1 0.02 54 48 PO U
II 47 48 5 B,A 5 0 4 1 0.02 46 47 IA
BC,A 2 2 0 0 0.01 51 47
B,AC 1 0 0 1 0.00 46 52
Valid Total 263 58 154 51 0.99 188 67 67 193 62
invalid 2 0 2 0 0.01 0.71 0.25 0.25 0.73 0.24
no value 2 0 2 0 0.01 0.70 0.25 0.25 0.72 0.23
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
C,A,BD 70 21 40 9 0.26 45 45 45 IA MM
A B C D B,C,AD 70 14 37 19 0.26 47 48 43 EF PO
I 5 47 45 3 B,A,CD 34 8 18 8 0.13 47 45 52 PO MM
II 45 5 48 2 B,AC,D 24 4 17 3 0.09 47 93 20 PO U
III 23 25 32 20 B,A,C 21 8 11 2 0.08 47 45 32
B,A,D 13 2 9 2 0.05 47 45 20
B,AD,C 10 0 8 2 0.04 47 47 32
B,C,A 6 0 4 2 0.02 47 48 23
C,A,B 2 0 2 0 0.01 45 45 25
B,C,D 2 0 1 1 0.01 47 48 20
A,B,CD 1 0 1 0 0.00 5 5 52
AB,C,D 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 48 20 PO
AD,B,C 1 0 1 0 0.00 8 5 32
A,B,D 1 0 1 0 0.00 5 5 20
C,B,AD 1 1 0 0 0.00 45 5 43
BD,AC,- 1 0 0 1 0.00 50 93 0 PO
Valid Total 258 58 151 49 0.97 70 130 24 70 104
invalid 8 0 6 2 0.03 0.27 0.50 0.09 0.27 0.40
no value 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.26 0.49 0.09 0.26 0.39
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
A,BD,CE 60 24 36 0.28 40 52 52 EF PO MM
A B C D E A,DE,BC 27 8 19 0.13 40 52 52 PO MM
I 40 2 3 25 30 A,BC,DE 21 6 15 0.10 40 34 38
II 14 26 8 26 26 A,D,C 17 6 11 0.08 40 26 26 EF
III 10 26 26 12 26 AE,BD,C 12 2 10 0.06 70 52 26 PO U
A,B,C 11 3 8 0.05 40 26 26 EF
AE,D,C 9 2 7 0.04 70 26 26
E,CD,AB 6 2 4 0.03 30 34 36
D,B,C 5 0 5 0.02 25 26 26 EF IA
A,CE,BD 5 1 4 0.02 40 34 38
BD,E,C 4 1 3 0.02 27 26 26 IA
AE,D,BC 3 0 3 0.01 70 26 52 PO U
A,E,C 3 0 3 0.01 40 26 26 EF
D,B,E 3 0 3 0.01 25 26 26 IA
A,B,CDE 2 0 2 0.01 40 26 64
E,B,C 2 0 2 0.01 30 26 26 EF
A,B,E 2 0 2 0.01 40 26 26 EF
AB,D,CE 1 0 1 0.00 42 26 52
A,BE,CD 1 0 1 0.00 40 52 38
A,CD,BE 1 0 1 0.00 40 34 52
AB,D,C 1 0 1 0.00 42 26 26
A,BD,E 1 0 1 0.00 40 52 26
A,B,CE 1 0 1 0.00 40 26 52
BD,C,E 1 0 1 0.00 27 8 26
D,AC,B 1 0 1 0.00 25 22 26
B,D,A 1 0 1 0.00 2 26 10
B,D,E 1 0 1 0.00 2 26 26
D,E,B 1 0 1 0.00 25 26 26 IA
D,E,C 1 0 1 0.00 25 26 26 IA
E,D,B 1 0 1 0.00 30 26 26 EF
ABE,D,C 1 1 0 0.00 72 26 26
Valid Total 206 56 150 0.95 101 102 15 14 87
invalid 4 0 4 0.02 0.49 0.50 0.07 0.07 0.42
no value 6 2 4 0.03 0.47 0.47 0.07 0.06 0.40
Total 216 58 158 1.00
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
Problem 1
Problem 2
Problem 3
Allocation Criteria Goods AllocationsSubject Groups Payoffs
Herreiner/Puppe Questionnaire Results 2
Allocations Total Allocation Criteria Goods AllocationsSubject Groups Payoffs
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
C,A,B 172 42 96 34 0.64 32 33 32 EF MM
A B C D B,C,A 44 7 28 9 0.16 31 31 31 IA
I 30 31 32 7 C,A,BD 12 4 5 3 0.04 32 33 39 PO U MM
II 33 29 31 7 CD,A,B 9 0 7 2 0.03 39 33 32 PO U MM
III 31 32 30 7 C,AD,B 6 0 5 1 0.02 32 40 32 PO U MM
B,A,C 5 2 3 0 0.02 31 33 30
C,BD,A 4 2 1 1 0.01 32 36 31
A,B,C 4 1 3 0 0.01 30 29 30
BC,A,D 2 0 2 0 0.01 63 33 7 PO
A,BD,C 2 0 1 1 0.01 30 36 30
CD,B,A 1 0 1 0 0.00 39 29 31
A,B,CD 1 0 1 0 0.00 30 29 37
Valid Total 262 58 153 51 0.98 172 29 27 44 199
invalid 3 0 3 0 0.01 0.66 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.76
no value 2 0 2 0 0.01 0.64 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.75
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
BC,AF,DE 108 36 72 0.50 52 48 51 EF PO U MM
A B C D E F BE,CF,AD 20 3 17 0.09 45 45 45 IA
I 5 20 32 3 25 15 CF,AD,BE 18 7 11 0.08 47 46 47 EF
II 26 7 23 20 2 22 C,A,E 15 5 10 0.07 32 26 30 EF
III 24 17 6 21 30 2 CD,AB,EF 9 1 8 0.04 35 33 32
C,AB,EF 5 0 5 0.02 32 33 32
BC,AD,EF 3 0 3 0.01 52 46 32
EF,CD,AB 3 0 3 0.01 40 43 41 EF
B,F,D 3 0 3 0.01 20 22 21 EF
AB,CD,EF 2 0 2 0.01 25 43 32
DE,BF,AC 2 1 1 0.01 28 29 30
AC,DF,BE 1 0 1 0.00 37 42 47
AD,BE,CF 1 0 1 0.00 8 9 8
B,ACF,DE 1 0 1 0.00 20 71 51 PO
BC,AE,DF 1 0 1 0.00 52 28 23
BF,AC,DE 1 0 1 0.00 35 49 51 PO
BF,CD,AE 1 0 1 0.00 35 43 54 EF PO
BCE,AF,D 1 0 1 0.00 77 48 21 PO
C,AE,BDF 1 0 1 0.00 32 28 40
D,ABCE,F 1 0 1 0.00 3 58 2
AC,BF,D 1 0 1 0.00 37 29 21
BD,C,A 1 0 1 0.00 23 23 24
C,BF,E 1 0 1 0.00 32 29 30
C,F,D 1 0 1 0.00 32 22 21
E,A,C 1 0 1 0.00 25 26 6
E,C,A 1 0 1 0.00 25 23 24
AB,CE,DF 1 1 0 0.00 25 25 23
BC,DF,AE 1 1 0 0.00 52 42 54 EF PO
C,AD,EF 1 1 0 0.00 32 46 32
CD,BF,E 1 1 0 0.00 35 29 30
Valid Total 207 57 150 0.96 149 113 108 20 108
invalid 6 0 6 0.03 0.72 0.55 0.52 0.10 0.52
no value 3 1 2 0.01 0.69 0.52 0.50 0.09 0.50
Total 216 58 158 1.00
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
D,AB,C 87 20 51 16 0.33 45 45 45 IA
A B C D A,BC,D 75 20 34 21 0.28 48 60 52 EF PO MM
I 48 4 3 45 A,C,D 49 12 32 5 0.18 48 40 52 EF
II 25 20 40 15 A,B,CD 21 2 16 3 0.08 48 20 97 PO U
III 2 1 45 52 AB,C,D 7 1 5 1 0.03 52 40 52 PO
A,BD,C 7 2 2 3 0.03 48 35 45
A,B,C 5 0 4 1 0.02 48 20 45
A,C,BD 1 0 1 0 0.00 48 40 53 PO
A,D,BC 1 0 1 0 0.00 48 15 46
AC,B,D 1 0 1 0 0.00 51 20 52
AD,B,C 1 0 1 0 0.00 93 20 45 PO
A,D,C 1 0 1 0 0.00 48 15 45
C,D,B 1 0 1 0 0.00 3 15 1
D,C,AB 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 40 3
D,C,B 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 40 1
A,B,D 1 1 0 0 0.00 48 20 52
D,C,A 1 0 0 1 0.00 45 40 2
Valid Total 261 58 152 51 0.98 124 105 21 87 75
invalid 4 0 4 0 0.01 0.48 0.40 0.08 0.33 0.29
no value 2 0 2 0 0.01 0.46 0.39 0.08 0.33 0.28
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
Problem 4
Problem 5
Problem 6
% of Total
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
Herreiner/Puppe Questionnaire Results 3
Allocations Total Allocation Criteria Goods AllocationsSubject Groups Payoffs
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM EML %
A,B,C,0,5,0 147 38 81 28 0.55 45 45 45 PO IA MM A,B,C 223 0.85
A B C A,B,C,0,0,5 34 8 20 6 0.13 45 40 50 EF PO C,B,A 19 0.07
I 45 30 25 C,B,A,5,0,0 10 1 7 2 0.04 30 40 50 -,B,AC 15 0.06
II 35 40 25 -,B,AC,5,0,0 9 1 5 3 0.03 5 40 95 PO U A,C,- 1 0.00
III 50 5 45 A,B,C,1,3,1 7 0 7 0 0.03 46 43 46 PO A,-,C 1 0.00
A,B,C,0,0,0 6 1 5 0 0.02 45 40 45 -,B,C 1 0.00
M=5 A,B,C,0,2,3 5 1 3 1 0.02 45 42 48 PO B,A,C 1 0.00
A,B,C,1,2,2 4 1 1 2 0.01 46 42 47 PO B,C,A 1 0.00
C,B,A,0,0,0 3 0 3 0 0.01 25 40 50 Total 262 1.00
A,B,C,2,1,2 3 1 2 0 0.01 47 41 47 PO
-,B,AC,4,1,0 3 0 2 1 0.01 4 41 95 PO U
A,B,C,0,4,1 3 1 1 1 0.01 45 44 46 PO
A,B,C,5,0,0 3 1 1 1 0.01 50 40 45 PO
A,B,C,1.66,1.66,1.66 2 0 2 0 0.01 47 42 47 PO
-,B,AC,3,2,0 2 0 2 0 0.01 3 42 95 PO U
A,B,C,1.5,2,1.5 2 0 1 1 0.01 47 42 47 PO
A,B,C,1,1,3 2 1 1 0 0.01 46 41 48 PO
C,B,A,1.66,1.66,1.66 2 1 0 1 0.01 27 42 52 PO
C,B,A,4,1,0 2 0 0 2 0.01 29 41 50 PO
A,B,C,0,3,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 43 45
A,B,C,0,0,3 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 40 48
A,B,C,0,2.5,2.5 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 43 48 PO
A,B,C,2,2,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 47 42 46 PO
C,B,A,3,1,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 28 41 51 PO
C,B,A,0,5,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 25 45 50 PO
-,B,AC,3.3,1.6,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 3 42 95
A,C,-,0,0,5 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 25 5
A,-,C,0,5,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 5 45
-,B,C,5,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 5 40 45
A,B,C,0,3,2 1 1 0 0 0.00 45 43 47 PO
B,A,C,5,0,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 35 35 45
B,C,A,2,2,1 1 0 0 1 0.00 32 27 51 PO
Valid Total 262 57 154 51 0.98 34 236 14 147 147
invalid 5 1 4 0 0.02 0.13 0.90 0.05 0.56 0.56
no value 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.13 0.88 0.05 0.55 0.55
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM EML %
A,BD,C,2,2,2 24 3 17 4 0.09 47 47 47 IA D,BC,A 86 0.33
A B C D A,BD,C,0,0,0 20 2 14 4 0.07 45 45 45 IA A,BD,C 60 0.23
I 45 4 3 48 D,C,A,0,7,0 18 4 12 2 0.07 48 47 52 EF D,C,A 45 0.17
II 15 20 40 25 BD,C,A,0,7,0 17 5 11 1 0.06 52 47 52 EF D,B,AC 25 0.10
III 52 1 45 2 D,C,A,0,0,0 14 2 12 0 0.05 48 40 52 EF BD,C,A 20 0.08
D,BC,A,4,0,3 14 1 8 5 0.05 52 60 55 EF PO D,C,AB 4 0.02
M=7 D,BC,A,5,0,2 13 5 6 2 0.05 53 60 54 EF PO A,BC,D 3 0.01
D,BC,A,6,0,1 12 5 6 1 0.04 54 60 53 EF PO B,C,D 2 0.01
A,BD,C,2,2,3 7 3 2 2 0.03 47 47 48 A,B,C 1 0.00
D,BC,A,2,0,5 6 3 1 2 0.02 50 60 57 EF PO AB,C,D 1 0.00
D,BC,A,3.5,0,3.5 6 3 0 3 0.02 52 60 56 EF PO AD,B,C 1 0.00
D,B,AC,3,3,1 5 0 4 1 0.02 51 23 98 PO U A,B,CD 1 0.00
D,BC,A,3,0,4 5 2 2 1 0.02 51 60 56 EF PO A,C,BD 1 0.00
D,BC,A,7,0,0 5 1 1 3 0.02 55 60 52 EF PO A,B,D 1 0.00
D,C,A,2,5,0 4 0 3 1 0.01 50 45 52 EF A,C,D 1 0.00
D,B,AC,0,7,0 4 1 2 1 0.01 48 27 97 PO U A,D,C 1 0.00
A,BD,C,2.33,2.33,2.33 4 3 1 0 0.01 47 47 47 IA C,BD,A 1 0.00
A,BD,C,2,3,2 3 0 1 2 0.01 47 48 47 C,B,D 1 0.00
D,B,AC,0,0,0 3 0 3 0 0.01 48 20 97 D,AB,C 1 0.00
D,BC,A,5,0,1 3 2 0 1 0.01 53 60 53 EF D,B,C 1 0.00
D,BC,A,4.66,0,2.33 2 0 1 1 0.01 53 60 54 EF PO -,-,- 1 0.00
D,BC,A,3,1,3 2 0 2 0 0.01 51 61 55 EF PO BC,A,D 1 0.00
D,BC,A,2,2,2 2 0 2 0 0.01 50 62 54 EF C,D,A 1 0.00
D,B,AC,2,5,0 2 0 2 0 0.01 50 25 97 PO U Total 260 1.00
D,C,AB,0,7,0 2 0 2 0 0.01 48 47 53
D,C,A,2,2,2 2 0 2 0 0.01 50 42 54 EF
D,BC,A,1,1,5 2 0 1 1 0.01 49 61 57 PO
D,B,AC,4,3,0 2 1 1 0 0.01 52 23 97 PO U
D,B,AC,3.5,3.5,0 2 1 1 0 0.01 52 24 97 PO U
D,C,A,2.33,2.33,2.33 2 1 1 0 0.01 50 42 54 EF
D,BC,A,5.5,0,1.5 2 2 0 0 0.01 54 60 54 EF PO MM
D,BC,A,2,1,2 2 1 0 1 0.01 50 61 54 EF
AB,C,D,0,7,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 49 47 2
AD,B,C,1,3,3 1 0 1 0 0.00 94 23 48 PO
A,BC,D,5,0,2 1 0 1 0 0.00 50 60 4
A,BC,D,2.33,2.33,2.33 1 0 1 0 0.00 47 62 4
A,BC,D,0,0,7 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 60 9
Problem 7
Problem 8
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
Herreiner/Puppe Questionnaire Results 4
Allocations Total Allocation Criteria Goods AllocationsSubject Groups Payoffs
A,C,BD,2,2,2 1 0 1 0 0.00 47 42 5
A,B,CD,7,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 20 47
A,B,C,0,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 20 45
A,B,D,7,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 20 2
A,C,D,0,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 40 2
A,D,C,0,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 25 45
BD,C,A,1,5,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 53 45 53
BD,C,A,0,3.5,3.5 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 44 56 PO
B,C,D,7,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 11 40 2
B,C,D,0,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 4 40 2
C,BD,A,3.5,3.5,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 7 49 52
C,B,D,2,3,2 1 0 1 0 0.00 5 23 4
D,AB,C,0,7,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 48 42 45
D,BC,A,2.5,2,2.5 1 0 1 0 0.00 51 62 55 EF PO
D,BC,A,1,0,5 1 0 1 0 0.00 49 60 57
D,BC,A,0,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 48 60 52 EF
D,B,AC,5,2,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 53 22 97 PO U
D,B,AC,4,2,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 22 98 PO U
D,B,AC,3,2,2 1 0 1 0 0.00 51 22 99 PO U
D,B,AC,2.3,4.6,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 50 25 97
D,B,C,1,2,4 1 0 1 0 0.00 49 22 49
D,C,AB,4,3,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 43 53 EF
D,C,AB,3,3,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 51 43 53 EF
D,C,A,4,2,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 52 42 53 EF
D,C,A,2,4,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 50 44 53 EF
-,-,-,2,2,2 1 0 1 0 0.00 2 2 2 EF IA
D,BC,A,3.5,3.5,0 1 1 0 0 0.00 52 64 52 EF PO
A,BD,C,2,1,4 1 1 0 0 0.00 47 46 49
D,C,A,2.5,1,3.5 1 1 0 0 0.00 51 41 56 EF
D,C,A,0,5,2 1 1 0 0 0.00 48 45 54 EF
D,C,A,0,6,1 1 1 0 0 0.00 48 46 53 EF
BD,C,A,0,0,7 1 1 0 0 0.00 52 40 59 PO
D,BC,A,2,2,3 1 0 0 1 0.00 50 62 55 EF PO
D,BC,A,2.33,2.33,2.33 1 0 0 1 0.00 50 62 54 EF PO
D,BC,A,5,2,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 53 62 52 EF PO
D,BC,A,4,1,2 1 0 0 1 0.00 52 61 54 EF PO
D,BC,A,4,0,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 52 60 52 EF
D,BC,A,3,0,3 1 0 0 1 0.00 51 60 55 EF
A,BD,C,3,2,2 1 0 0 1 0.00 48 47 47
D,B,AC,3,4,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 51 24 97 PO U
D,B,AC,1,6,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 49 26 97 PO U
D,B,AC,3,3,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 51 23 97
BC,A,D,0,0,7 1 0 0 1 0.00 7 15 9
C,D,A,7,0,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 10 25 52
Valid Total 260 57 152 51 0.97 148 98 20 49 2
invalid 5 0 5 0 0.02 0.57 0.38 0.08 0.19 0.01
no value 2 1 1 0 0.01 0.55 0.37 0.07 0.18 0.01
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM
BC,D,A 91 27 45 19 0.34 60 54 49 EF PO MM
A B C D AC,B,D 80 14 49 17 0.30 43 43 43 IA
I 23 40 20 17 B,D,A 47 13 29 5 0.18 40 54 49 EF
II 2 43 1 54 C,BD,A 11 1 7 3 0.04 20 97 49 PO U
III 49 4 4 43 B,D,AC 6 3 1 2 0.02 40 54 53 PO
B,A,D 3 0 3 0 0.01 40 2 43
C,D,A 3 0 3 0 0.01 20 54 49
CD,B,A 3 0 2 1 0.01 37 43 49
C,B,A 2 0 1 1 0.01 20 43 49
A,B,D 2 0 0 2 0.01 23 43 43
AB,C,D 1 0 1 0 0.00 63 1 43 PO
A,B,CD 1 0 1 0 0.00 23 43 47
BD,C,A 1 0 1 0 0.00 57 1 49
B,AC,D 1 0 1 0 0.00 40 3 43
B,CD,A 1 0 1 0 0.00 40 55 49 EF PO
B,A,C 1 0 1 0 0.00 40 2 4
B,D,C 1 0 1 0 0.00 40 54 4
C,D,AB 1 0 1 0 0.00 20 54 53
D,BC,A 1 0 1 0 0.00 17 44 49
D,B,A 1 0 1 0 0.00 17 43 49
-,AB,CD 1 0 1 0 0.00 0 45 47
-,D,A 1 0 1 0 0.00 0 54 49
AD,C,B 1 0 0 1 0.00 40 1 4
Valid Total 261 58 152 51 0.98 139 110 11 80 91
invalid 3 0 3 0 0.01 0.53 0.42 0.04 0.31 0.35
no value 3 0 3 0 0.01 0.52 0.41 0.04 0.30 0.34
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
Problem 9
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
Herreiner/Puppe Questionnaire Results 5
Allocations Total Allocation Criteria Goods AllocationsSubject Groups Payoffs
EML Econ Math Law % U1 U2 U3 EF PO U IA MM EML %
C,B,A,0,9,0 57 7 35 15 0.21 44 45 44 PO C,B,A 198 0.76
A B C C,B,A,0,8,0 50 10 35 5 0.19 44 44 44 IA A,B,C 31 0.12
I 53 3 44 C,B,A,9,0,0 23 7 11 5 0.09 53 36 44 PO AC,B,- 11 0.04
II 35 36 29 C,B,A,1,8,0 15 7 6 2 0.06 45 44 44 PO C,A,B 9 0.03
III 44 30 25 C,B,A,3,3,3 9 0 9 0 0.03 47 39 47 PO A,C,B 5 0.02
A,B,C,0,0,9 9 0 6 3 0.03 53 36 34 PO ABC,-,- 1 0.00
M=9 C,B,A,0.33,8.33,0.33 9 9 0 0 0.03 44 44 44 PO IA MM B,A,C 1 0.00
C,B,A,4,3,2 5 0 4 1 0.02 48 39 46 PO -,B,A 1 0.00
C,A,B,3,3,3 5 0 4 1 0.02 47 38 33 B,C,- 1 0.00
AC,B,-,0,0,9 4 0 3 1 0.01 97 36 9 PO U A,B,- 1 0.00
A,B,C,0,2,7 4 0 2 2 0.01 53 38 32 PO -,-,- 1 0.00
C,B,A,0,0,0 4 2 2 0 0.01 44 36 44 Total 260 1.00
C,B,A,5,2,2 4 3 1 0 0.01 49 38 46 PO
A,B,C,9,0,0 3 0 3 0 0.01 62 36 25 PO
A,B,C,3,3,3 3 1 2 0 0.01 56 39 28 PO
C,B,A,6,3,0 3 1 1 1 0.01 50 39 44 PO
AC,B,-,0,3,6 3 1 0 2 0.01 97 39 6 PO U
A,B,C,0,0,0 2 0 2 0 0.01 53 36 25
A,B,C,2,2,5 2 0 1 1 0.01 55 38 30 PO
A,B,C,1,3,5 2 0 1 1 0.01 54 39 30 PO
A,B,C,0,9,0 2 1 1 0 0.01 53 45 25 PO
C,B,A,0.5,8,0.5 2 1 1 0 0.01 45 44 45 PO
C,B,A,4,5,0 2 1 0 1 0.01 48 41 44 PO
A,B,C,0,1,8 2 1 0 1 0.01 53 37 33 PO
ABC,-,-,9,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 109 0 0 PO
AC,B,-,0,4,5 1 0 1 0 0.00 97 40 5 PO U
AC,B,-,0,2,7 1 0 1 0 0.00 97 38 7 PO U
AC,B,-,0,1,8 1 0 1 0 0.00 97 37 8 PO U
A,B,C,8,0,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 61 36 26 PO
A,C,B,2,4,3 1 0 1 0 0.00 55 33 33 PO
A,C,B,1,3,5 1 0 1 0 0.00 54 32 35 PO
A,C,B,0,9,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 53 38 30
A,C,B,0,5,4 1 0 1 0 0.00 53 34 34
A,B,-,0,0,9 1 0 1 0 0.00 53 36 9
B,A,C,0,9,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 3 44 25
B,C,-,0,0,9 1 0 1 0 0.00 3 29 9
C,A,B,9,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 53 35 30
C,A,B,2,1,6 1 0 1 0 0.00 46 36 36
C,B,A,6,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 50 36 44
C,B,A,3.5,2,3.5 1 0 1 0 0.00 48 38 48 PO
C,B,A,1,7,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 43 45 PO
C,B,A,1,6,1 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 42 45
C,B,A,1,4,3 1 0 1 0 0.00 45 40 47
C,B,A,0,0,9 1 0 1 0 0.00 44 36 53 PO
-,B,A,9,0,0 1 0 1 0 0.00 9 36 44
-,-,-,3,3,3 1 0 1 0 0.00 3 3 3 EF IA
C,B,A,8.33,0.33,0.33 1 1 0 0 0.00 52 36 44 PO
C,B,A,7,2,0 1 1 0 0 0.00 51 38 44 PO
C,B,A,5,0,4 1 1 0 0 0.00 49 36 48 PO
C,B,A,3,6,0 1 1 0 0 0.00 47 42 44 PO
C,B,A,2,7,0 1 1 0 0 0.00 46 43 44 PO
AC,B,-,1,3,5 1 1 0 0 0.00 98 39 5 PO U
C,B,A,4,2.5,2.5 1 0 0 1 0.00 48 39 47 PO
C,B,A,0,5,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 44 41 44
C,B,A,5,4,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 49 40 44 PO
C,B,A,3,4,2 1 0 0 1 0.00 47 40 46 PO
A,B,C,1,1,7 1 0 0 1 0.00 54 37 32 PO
C,A,B,0,9,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 44 44 30
C,A,B,0,0,0 1 0 0 1 0.00 44 35 30
A,C,B,0,4,5 1 0 0 1 0.00 53 33 35
Valid Total 260 58 152 50 0.97 1 183 11 60 9
invalid 6 0 5 1 0.02 0.00 0.70 0.04 0.23 0.03
no value 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.04 0.22 0.03
Total 267 58 158 51 1.00
Problem 10
# Allocations
% of Valid Total
% of Total
